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On 25 February 1970, the Polish Minister of Defence Wojciech Jaruzelski 
signed the document “Plan Operacji Zaczepnej Frontu Nadmorskiego” or 
“Plan for an Offensive Operation of the Coastal Front”. However, this is not 
an ordinary military administrative or planning document. In fact, the 
document is one large map of the area from Kaliningrad in the east, to 
England in the west, and from mid-Germany in the south to Skagen, 
Denmark, in the north. The map displays the complete combined opera-
tional land, naval and offensive tactical air plans for the use of the Polish 
armed forces in a giant operation against NATO forces in northern Germany, 
Denmark, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, known in Soviet termino-
logy as the Western Theatre of Military Action. Developed during the 1960s, 
when Poland had the mission within the Warsaw Pact Forces to lead the 
northern part of the onslaught against NATO (Hillingsø, 2004, pp. 163–165), 
The map of the Plan for an Offensive Operation of the 
Coastal Front from Poland 1970 forms the basis for this 
paper. The map portrays the blueprint of the combined 
operational war plans for the Polish armed forces in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s. It details an offensive against 
NATO countries and their forces in Northern Europe.
As such, this map is clearly designed, not just as an actual 
plan of the offensive, but also to produce a narrative about 
the Polish army as capable of undertaking such a massive 
enterprise. We argue, taking our point of departure from 
this particular map, that military maps can be understood 
as performative maps, outlining not just plans and struc-
turing space, but often also narratives.
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the map details how the Polish high command 
envisioned such an enterprise. Countless hours of 
work have probably been invested by the Polish 
military headquarters staff on operational and 
strategic analyses in advance of the actual plan-
ning of this large and complex operation.
As a result, the map represents the perceived 
ability of the Polish military to conduct and plan 
operations on a grand scale. One interpretation of 
the map is that it was intended to enhance the 
prestige of the Polish military, marking its 
capabilities to fight in the first echelon against 
NATO, not only work internally in Poland, but also 
more broadly within the Warsaw Treaty Organi-
sation (WTO). However, the map also reveals the 
potentially horrifying consequences for the 
western countries, which were the target of 
numerous nuclear warheads, to be deployed 
during the operation. 
This daunting, yet fascinating map of an attack 
of the Coastal Front offers a good starting point for 
discussing the relationship between performativity 
and cartography in relation to military operations 
and planning. Here, performativity is understood 
with a point of departure in the role of the map as 
processual rather than purely representational 
(Kitchen & Dodge, 2007) and mapping as proces-
sual. At the same time the map is embedded in 
social practices and imbued with meaning and 
power relations (Harley, 1989). Hence, we take the 
map to be more than a representation, but rather a 
processual media relating and structuring space, 
relations and narratives (Butler, 2010). The article 
begins with a brief theoretical discussion on the 
relation between cartography and military 
practices, followed by a discussion of the origin of 
the map and the translation of the content.
THE ANATOMY OF MILITARY MAPPING
The military has a longstanding relationship, not 
just with geography, but also with maps and 
cartography. Strabo, writing in the first century BC 
in his Geographica, was aware of the interest of the 
military in geography (Strabo, translated 2002). 
With the Napoleonic Wars, maps were introduced 
onto the battlefield and into the planning of 
military operations on a larger scale (Black, 2009). 
This more widespread use of cartography could be 
seen to also coincide with the establishment and 
consolidation of new states and the assertion and 
projection of power, as argued by Dennis Wood 
(Wood et al., 2010). Traditionally, the military use of 
cartography has been and still is embedded in a 
specialized military relationship to space. Wood-
ward (2004) argues that this military perception of 
space is a rather rationalistic relationship, strictly 
focused on phenomena of military importance. 
However, Gregory (2010) argues that the US 
military’s use of maps in Bagdad and other Iraqi 
cities during the US military engagements in Iraq, 
where maps were used for press briefings and 
formed the visual basis for a reconfiguring of the 
city, also brought the map out of the traditional 
military way of thinking about the map, onto a 
stage where the map was used not just as a repre-
sentation, but also to perform spaces of the city. 
The military perception of space is scale-depen-
dent in relation to the practical application of 
cartography for military activities. Galgano and 
Palka (2011) argue that military forces operate 
across a wide range of scales and that for each scale 
a certain mode of operation is maintained. Hence, 
at the global, international level, military interest 
is identified as being strategic and political, while 
the regional scale renders itself to operational 
considerations and the local scale to tactical 
decisions and analyses. Characteristic of the 
relationship between military practices and 
cartography on all scale levels, is that cartography 
functions as a link between a set of basic spatial 
conditions, typically physical constraints on the 
use of military forces, and the planning for, and 
use of, forces in military operations. As such, the 
map functions as the basic chessboard, where the 
movement, planning and use of the chessmen 
(military units) is related to and structured by the 
board (base map) (Svenningsen, 2016). However, 
political constraints also have an impact on the use 
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same time, maps can only be understood within 
the cultural context in which they are produced, 
circulated and used (Cosgrove, 2008), which would 
indicate that in order to examine the performative 
role of military maps and mapping, it is worth-
while to take a closer look at the specific circum-
stances surrounding this particular map. In the 
following, therefore, we will briefly examine the 
role of the Polish People’s Army within the WTO  
towards the end of the 1960s in order to under-
stand the cultural and political context into which 
the map was produced and circulated in the late 
1960s and 1970s. 
THE POLISH PEOPLE’S ARMY AND CARTO-
GRAPHY IN THE WARSAW PACT ORGANI-
SATION FORCE STRUCTURE
The Warsaw Pact was created in 1955 as a multila-
teral military organisation of the Soviet Union and 
its Eastern European satellite states and it presen-
ted a direct military counterweight to NATO. Thus, 
it supplemented the bilateral arrangements and 
means of direct control that had ensured Soviet 
control of the national armed forces of the satellite 
states. Post-Cold War research suggests the reasons 
behind its creation were twofold. First, it was a 
direct reaction to the formation of the Bundeswehr 
and the planned rearmament of West Germany 
and its integration into NATO in 1955. Second, it 
was motivated by the Soviet desire to maintain a 
stricter control over the individual militaries in 
Soviet-controlled Central and Eastern Europe 
(Stone, 2002, p. 248). This second reason is clearly 
underlined by the fact that questions relating to 
membership criteria, responsibilities and 
influence of the : individual militaries within the 
WTO were a source of continual political tension 
between the Soviet Union and its satellites.
From the end of World War II until the fall of 
communism, the Polish People’s Army’s internal 
national prestige was in continual decline, 
although a military career in the Polish People’s 
Army was still an attractive prospect in comparison 
with other WTO member countries. This steady 
of military forces, although this mostly relates to 
the strategic scale. In fact, the impact of the 
physical constraints on military actions is so 
strong, that large parts of the globe have seen very 
limited or no military activity (Keegan, 2011).  
In this paper, we examine the anatomy of 
military mapping by an analysis of the map of the 
Plan of an Offensive Operation of the Coastal Front. 
We argue that military mapping is intrinsic to 
military operations, that the military use of maps 
is highly scale dependent, and that the role of the 
military map will change with the scale as the 
operations of the military will vary across the same 
scales. Hence, military maps at the global level will 
be maps of political relations and projections of 
power. At this scale, the map is a clear means of 
communicating political allegiances and oppo-
nents and often these maps work in clear, distinct 
colours and borders in order to leave no room for 
misunderstandings. These could for instance be 
maps showing the clear borders between the 
various military theatres of the US military, 
overlaid on a map displaying political divisions 
globally. At the local level, military mapping has a 
tendency to become focused on highly tactical 
matters, such as mobility, structure and cover in 
the landscape (Doyle and Bennett, 2002; 
Svenningsen, 2014). Contemporary tactical maps 
are based on various types of remotely sensed 
information (Gregory, 2010) of the area in question 
and will often contain a wealth of information 
about the physical features of the landscape. They 
enable highly symbolized, minute and detailed 
planning of tactical operations (Clarke, 2011). In 
between  these two scales of military maps, we find 
the operational, regional scale map. While this 
map is also found to be a measure of planning, the 
scale of intent in the operational map is reserved to 
the operational level. As such, the operational scale 
is expressed as the sum of the measures from large 
scale maps. This, at the same time, marks the 
operational map as highly performative in so far as 
the regional military map actually produces the 
phenomena that it regulates (Butler, 2010). At the 
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overall decline was primarily caused by the 
communist government’s use of the army to 
resettle ethnicities immediately after the war and 
to violently suppress political opposition during 
the Poznan protests in 1956, the Polish 1970 
protests, and later, during the period of Martial law 
in Poland in 1981-82.
In Poland, tension with the Soviet Union also 
led to changes in the higher echelons of the Polish 
military establishment. In 1968, shortly before the 
Polish People’s Army took part in the suppression 
of the Czechoslovakian uprising, the known Soviet 
loyalist and acting Polish chief of staff, General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, was made Polish Minister of 
Defence. According to a leading expert on Polish 
political and military relations, Andrew A. Michta, 
the appointment and promotion of Jaruzelski 
reflec ted the Soviet decision to “put a trusted 
group of officers in control of one of the least 
trusted armies in the Warsaw Pact forces.” (Michta, 
1990, p. 62). Jaruzelski would later sign and 
approve the map presented here on 25 February 
1970.
In 1945, Stalin decreed that the first priority for 
the USSR Military and Civil State Topographic 
Services was the production of a 1:100,000 map of 
the entire Soviet Union. The task was achieved by 
1954, and upon its approaching completion, 
Moscow’s attention shifted to the mapping of 
Soviet satellite states and other parts of the world. 
In 1952, a conference in Sofia of the geodetic 
services of what were to become the WTO nations, 
adopted a series of resolutions whereby all the 
“socialist” countries of Europe would prepare their 
maps according to Russian standards. (Cruicks-
hank, 2007).
In the case of the Polish military geographic 
service, its geodesy and cartography was thus 
heavily influenced by Soviet solutions. Further-
more, its organization, tasks, and responsibilities 
were heavily subordinate to Soviet military 
doctrine. (Sobczynski, 2010).
According to a biography of the Polish officer and 
defector Ryszard Kuklinski, in the late 1960s, the 
Polish General Staff was tasked by the Soviet military 
to develop a major joint exercise for the WTO armies. 
The aim of the so-called “Spring 69” exercise was to 
practice the general plans for a war against NATO in 
Central Europe. The officer in charge of this effort 
was Lieutenant -Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, who due 
to the need for information on the grand strategy for 
developing such a comprehensive operational plan, 
obtained insight into key Soviet military planning 
documents (Weiser, 2004, pp. 49–51). The preparation 
of the prestigious plan was carefully undertaken, and 
maps and cartographic design were important tools 
for the communication of the Polish plan: “After 
returning to Warsaw, Kuklinski worked three more 
weeks on the plans, re-creating the opera tional 
scenario for a Soviet-run war in Central Europe. 
When he was done, the Polish General Staff’s 
intelligence division, which had sophisticated 
printing equipment, produced several high-quality 
copies of the map for a presentation to Soviet 
officials. One map was ordered destroyed because the 
color was slightly off.” (Weiser, 2004: 50). Kuklinskis’ 
design of the exercise was a success. Not only did the 
Soviet General Staff approve the plan, but it later 
turned out that the plan had been too successful, as it 
was too close to the actual Soviet plans. Consequently, 
Moscow eventually ordered the plan collected from 
the units involved in the exercise and the plan was 
destroyed (Weiser, 2004: 51).
The story reveals two interesting aspects about the 
Polish military during the 1960-70s. First, high 
ranking, trusted staff officers of the Polish Army were 
employed to develop parts of the operational plans 
for Western Europe. Second, cartography and 
cartographic visualization was important, not only as 
a tool for framing the military plans to geography, 
but also as a communicative – or performative device, 
to promote the planning capacity and thus prestige 
of the Polish military internally in the WTO.
THE ORIGINS OF THE MAP AND THE 
TRANS LATION
Today, it is difficult to ascertain unambiguously 
exactly how this map was produced; who was 
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the Rhine as a military exercise was developed on 
the assumption of a NATO first nuclear strike along 
the Vistula line and was as such conceived and 
presented as a strategically defensive move against 
an aggressive NATO force. Yet, the plan is clearly 
founded on the same structure and the same 
principles as that of the attack of the coastal front. 
We take this to indicate that the basic ideas 
underpinning the plan for the coastal front attack 
from 1970 presented thoughts and ideas that are 
indeed indicative of WTO doctrine to the point 
where, almost ten years later, a military exercise 
with almost identical troop deployment and 
operational logic is presented and used as the basis 
for military exercises. However, it has been 
impossible to unambiguously determine whether 
the 1970 map was part of the 2005 declassification 
or was declassified later.
We came into contact with the map following a 
lecture in the Danish Commission of Military 
History, where Carsten Barløse and Michael H. 
Clemmesen presented the map and the implica-
tions for the Danish understanding and the 
military during the Cold War. The map was passed 
on to Carsten Barlsøe, who has made all the 
translations and has assisted us in our further 
work with the map. Today the original map is kept 
by the museum at Langelandsfortet.
ANALYSIS: THE OPERATIONAL MAP OF THE 
POLISH COASTAL FRONT 1970
The map of the attack of the Coastal Front
The map of the attack of the Coastal Front can be 
seen in figure 1. The first impression of the map is 
the striking insistence of the mapmaker on 
maintaining a specific map projection, despite the 
consequences for the expression of the full map, 
giving the full size map the conical expression 
which is so prominent in the map. While the 
specific projection is no doubt meant to conform to 
other standards, it also gives the map a certain “air 
of authority” (see also Hauck et al., 2013) by linking 
the map to longstanding, academic and, for most 
people, esoteric science of map projections. 
present at the different stages of the planning 
process, who was consulted, and when. In the 
following, we will refer to the map, and the plan, 
as a Polish enterprise, since it was developed in 
Poland showing the Polish forces and it involves 
the high command and political leadership of 
Poland. However, the framework for the informa-
tion of the map was probably the overall contem-
porary planning by the Soviet General Staff and by 
the Soviet “Red Banner” Baltic Fleet, and it seems 
reasonable to suggest that Soviet officers monito-
red and guided the Polish headquarters that 
developed the actual plans for the various Polish 
formations shown on the map, even if this is to 
some degree challenged by Weiser (2004), as 
described above. 
In 1980, perhaps to decrease their own uncer-
tainty on the core question of Non-Soviet WTO 
member states’ reliability, the USSR developed the 
1980 wartime statute to formalize the procedures 
by which the Soviet Union would seize operational 
control over Eastern European military forces. 
According to Harvard Cold War Studies Project 
Director Mark Kramer (See Wilson Center, 2016), it 
did little to change plans which had in fact been in 
place for years. Pointing to the Soviet-led Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kramer suggested 
that the actual preparations undertaken for the 
invasion in 1968 were very similar to procedures 
codified later in the 1980 statute.
In Warsaw, the Colonel Kuklinski Intelligence 
Museum (See Coldwarssites, 2016) exhibits a 
version of the map and tells the story of Col. 
Kuklinski, who smuggled the map out of Poland 
and handed it over to the CIA. Later, following 
elections in Poland, the Polish government in 2005 
declassified numerous documents and made them 
public in an effort to shed light on the past. During 
the 2005 declassification, another military plan 
was publicized; “Seven days to the Rhine”. Seven 
days to the Rhine was planned and developed as 
the basis for a WTO exercise in 1979 and is very 
clearly based on the blueprints of the plans for the 
attack of the coastal front in 1970. Seven days to 
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are used to signal force, decisiveness and deter-
mination. Oddly however, intentional arrows were 
not part of the standard symbol set for military 
documents detailed in successive Soviet and 
Russian Military Topography manuals (Department 
of the Army, 1958; Psarev, 2005) and it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the cartographers took a 
page from an older tradition of arrows and displays 
of power and decisiveness.
Inserted at the lower part of the map are five 
smaller, inserted annexes in white, clearly standing 
out from the rest of the map. These five annexes 
have all been typed out on a typewriter, lending 
both a cold war atmosphere and authenticity to 
the map. The colouration of the map and especially 
of the oceans clearly gives the impression that this 
map has been assembled by stitching together a 
number of different maps. With its massive 
headline, impressive design and appearance, this 
map is marked with a security classification which 
The map itself is designed in a dramatic design 
language, with large red arrows pouring out of the 
right-hand, eastern, part of the map, cutting across 
Western Europe, unstoppable by forests, rivers and 
other natural obstacles and unaffected by major 
cities and political lines of division.
Arrows have been, and are still, regarded as an 
almost intrinsic property of military planning and 
cartography. Some arrows are narrow and deline-
ate a route to be followed; the winding of a road or 
a path, the narrow route from one specific place to 
another. Other arrows, such as the ones on the 
map of the attack of the Coastal Front are broad, 
coloured arrows used to portray the mass move-
ment of large contingents of troops and materiel. 
These arrows have a root, a starting point, which is 
usually the deployment area. They have a highly 
generalized direction and certainly they are aimed 
at a target; the end of operations. These arrows are 
referred to as intentional arrows (NATO, 1986) and 
 
Figure 1. Plan of an Offensive Operation of the Coastal Front. The heading is quite clear, as well as the authorization 
of Defence Minister Jaruzelski (top left) on 25 February 1970. Classified as Tajne Spec Znaczenia, equivalent to NATO 
Cosmic Top Secret, the base map seems to be composed of a number of 1:500.000 map sheets, made by the Polish 
General Staff and based on Soviet maps. 
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will ensure that only few people would have been 
allowed to actually see the map. At all times, it 
would have been held in a high-security military 
archive. Nevertheless, it is still a map designed to 
be impressive when displayed on such special 
occasions. 
In some respects, the map is situated in a 
longstanding political and cartographic tradition 
of referring to tentacles across territories. In the 
late 19th century and early part of the 20th 
century, many maps portraying one “enemy” or the 
other as an octopus with tentacles, slowly constric-
ting the European continent, were numerous, as 
illustrated in figure 2. Figure 2 is a WW1 French 
wartime propaganda poster designed to portray 
the Prussian (and German) state as protruding its 
tentacles across the European continent. This type 
of imagery is not uncommon and can be found on 
numerous posters around the turn of the century. 
While the octopus may have had its heyday as top 
pet to the cartographer around the beginning of 
the 20th century, the octopus is still around and it 
is still telling the same story. Obviously, the 
forceful intentional arrows of the map of the 
attack of the Coastal Front have no resemblance to 
the slow constricting movements of the tentacles of 
an octopus as in figure 2. Still, the idiomatic 
underpinnings of the two maps illustrated in 
figure 1 and in figure 2 are quite clear. 
 
The logic of military operational planning and 
mapping
As discussed above, the information on the map 
represents the results of an extended planning 
exercise by the Polish army. It gives a highly 
complex compression of complicated information 
 
Figure 2. French WW1 propaganda poster employing the same idiom as the plan of the attack of the coastal front from 
1970. Many other examples of the octopus symbolism can be found from the same period in European history.
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involving hundreds of thousands of men and 
thousands of pieces of materiel being moved 
forward. However, as with all plans, this plan is 
essentially building on a number of assumptions. 
The first assumption, which is so apparent in much 
large-scale military planning, is the assumption that 
the enemy will basically stand still as a passive 
player, merely observing your own brilliant 
manoeuvring and the unfolding of your plan, which 
will inevitably lead to his destruction. Nowhere does 
the map allow for NATO land forces to do anything 
else than remain in the respective deployment 
areas. Nowhere do we find the allowance for a 
particular enterprising NATO commander taking 
the initiative locally, or for the inevitable and 
plainly unsolvable traffic jam slowing down 
movement and blocking plans far into the hinter-
lands. Whether this is due to actual intelligence of 
NATO defence plans, which called for a very static 
defence of the West German border, or if it is a 
broader ontological issue in operational military 
mapping, cannot be established unambiguously on 
this basis. Only in the Baltic and in Kattegat is it 
indicated that the attack plan will meet some sort of 
resistance. This is indicated by empty arrows 
pointing in the opposite direction – towards the 
Polish forces – clearly indicating resilience or actual 
resistance (see figure 3). 
In many respects, this seems almost to be an 
ontological issue in military planning and mapping 
to which the solution has been to develop war games 
rather than maps for more complicated considerati-
ons of military manoeuvres. Hence, war gaming has 
been part of military training and planning since its 
introduction by the Prussian General Staff following 
the Napoleonic Wars (Kirchenbaum, 2010)
The map of the offensive of the Coastal Front is 
not just a spatial enterprise detailing what 
military unit goes where, it is also temporal in the 
sense that it specifies which military unit goes 
where and when. Various indicators are inserted 
onto the map, detailing the temporal expectations 
of the planners; red lines showing the extent of 
the operations after one day of fighting, after two 
days etc., until the fruition of the plan after six 
days, where the Polish forces have conquered all 
of Denmark and Northern Germany and are ready 
to continue towards northern France in what 
almost seems to echo the Schlieffen plan of the 
First World War. Hence, the complex nature of the 
map becomes an articulation of space-time (e.g. 
Harvey, 2009), while at the same time collapsing 
the actual time aspect of the military operations, 
turning everything into a two-dimensional 
representation of space and manoeuvres. It seems 
tempting to suggest that this underlines the 
relational nature of the map, where each military 
unit is in constant relation to itself and all other 
involved units, including the enemy. At the same 
time, the map remains an absolute scale enter-
prise with its firm foundation in the physical 
environment; rivers, coastlines and distances, 
while at the same time a relative perspective is 
maintained through the constant insistence on 
achieving the goals set out in the plan and 
highlighted through the datelines.  
The most precise planning represented on the 
 
Figure 3. Subset of the map focused on Fehmarn Belt 
with indications of resistance or resilience.
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map concerns itself with the initial onslaught of 
day 1, which was planned to develop along the 
East-West German border and into northern 
Germany (see figure 4). Here we find very detailed 
planning, down to division level, with precise 
instructions concerning the deployment of tactical 
nuclear weapons, the relative position of infantry 
and armour and general directions of movement. 
As (plan) time goes by, the planning becomes less 
and less detailed and as the planning approaches 
day 5 and 6, it seems almost to be an expression of 
intent rather than actual planning. One exception 
to this is the attack on Zealand, which will be 
carried out on days 5 and 6 after the defeat of 
NATO forces in northern Germany, and in Jutland 
and on Funen in Denmark. Only then will 6th 
Airborne Division of the Polish forces be deployed 
together with the 15th landing division and a 
number of operational nuclear warheads in the 
final conquest of Denmark, which by this time is 
limited to Zealand and the operations of the 
Danish 1st and 2nd Zealand Brigade. Hence, time is 
not a gradual, linear progressing factor. Rather, 
time in this map is highly flexible, and can be 
adjusted to the circumstances of the operations 
planned. It does seem clear, however, that the 
detailed planning of the final attack on Zealand is 
contingent on the successful accomplishment of 
the preceding parts of the plan. That is, the attack 
on Zealand will not occur until NATO resistance in 
Jutland and Funen has been defeated. The incre-
mental planning aspect of this map clearly stands 
out in this manner and must be considered a key 
component, not just in this map, but in military 
planning and mapping in general.
Cartographic representations
The main part of the Polish attack plan is made up 
of an overlay on the base map of various military 
symbols, representing the main parts of the plan, 
such as the direction of attack, placement of NATO 
units and targets for the use of nuclear weapons. 
The focus of the map is clearly oriented towards a 
decisive military action of the Polish coastal front: 
a breakthrough of the NATO lines in the Lu-
beck-Hamburg area. As mentioned above, this is 
 
Figure 4. Detail of the map covering Northern Germany and parts of Holland showing the very precise use of time in 
the plan.
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not only the most detailed part of the plan, it is 
also in the very centre of the map. 
The operational plan of the Polish coastal front is 
presented in an independent context. Aside from 
enemy NATO units indicated on the map in their 
blue deployment areas, the only other forces 
indicated on the map are rather vague indications 
of the operations of the 2nd Soviet Guards Army to 
the south of the Polish forces. Also, a few supporting 
East German military units assisting in the final 
assault on Zealand are indicated on the map. Hence, 
the plan is on the one hand compressing the 
enormous complexity of planning and administe-
ring the interface between the various fighting 
forces; nationality, traditions, equipment, commu-
nication etc., while at the same time indicating the 
conditions of possibility among the relations 
between the various actors operating on the map; 
the meshwork of the operation, unfolding the 
perceived functions and spaces (Kitchin et al., 2013) 
of the operation once hostilities break out.
Clearly, the military operations have been 
structured by physical-geographical conditions as 
well as opposing and friendly military units to 
form a basis of military structuring of the space 
(Svenningsen, 2014). Political borders, although 
represented in the base maps, play a non-signifi-
cant role. This would seem to correlate well with 
the assumption that operational military mapping 
is performative rather than political, as discussed 
in the introduction. Here we find that political 
dividing lines, such as international borders, 
administrative divisions and other aspects of 
political life, are almost indistinct, if not absent on 
the map, and the military structuring of space 
proceeds without taking these into consideration 
in the structuring of space for conflict. 
Contrary to most political and strategic maps, 
this map represents the evolution of an armed 
conflict between two military alliances, NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. This underpins the military 
character of the map and the operational plan-
ning, as a plan driven completely by a military 
rationality, formed by friendly and enemy units 
and the physical geography, not by people in 
national states or politicians. It presents raw 
rationalistic military decisions. However, the use of 
nuclear weapons stands out from this military 
rationality, as the plan operates with two different 
functions and uses of nuclear weapons; tactical 
and operational, each marked with a distinctive 
symbol. Clearly, the use of operational nuclear 
weapons requires a political decision, while the 
massive use of tactical nuclear weapons seems 
almost to be an integrated part of the military 
operation planned for and apparently decided on 
an operational level.
This division is also indicated by the carto-
graphic representation, where the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons is itemised in inset 6 as well as in 
the main operational plan, where the targets for 
tactical nuclear explosions are marked with a 
small red point, while operational nuclear targets 
are marked with a big red bomb symbol. However, 
it is worth mentioning that while it must be 
assumed that the use of strategic nuclear weapons 
can only be planned for, and later approved, with a 
high level of political involvement, the targets 
chosen in the planning do not stand out as targets 
of high political value, but are mostly selected for 
their strategic military value. Targets for opera-
tional nuclear explosions are the large ports along 
the German and Dutch coastlines. It is assumed 
that the purpose of targeting the large port areas is 
to prevent naval redeployment or NATO rein for-
cements. It is odd, therefore, that the harbour in 
Esbjerg is not scheduled as a target, since the 
harbour in Esbjerg could be used to bring in 
reinforcements to the hard-pressed NATO forces 
that would be operating in Northern Germany and 
in Denmark. However, this is possibly due to the 
plan’s visualization only of the action of the Polish 
military, thus leaving out other Warsaw Pact 
actions. This is also indicated by the complete lack 
of any activities, such as airstrikes on strategic 
airfields and supporting installations, as well as 
interdiction on NATO forces outside the opera-
tional area of the coastal front, which would be 
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required for the Polish efforts to be a success. 
Again, the final attack on Zealand stands out, as no 
less than 5 out of a total of 17 operational nuclear 
weapons will be detonated as part of the struggle 
for Zealand. The fortification in Stevns is clearly 
identified as a target and the strategic value of 
defeating this particular fortification prior to the 
combined Polish and East German naval, amphi-
bious operations seems obvious. Greve, south east 
of Copenhagen was a target as it was close to the 
deployment of 1st Zealand Brigade. So was Holbæk, 
which was the base of the only nuclear weapon- 
capable artillery unit on Zealand. The area west of 
the town was also one of the two logistics depot 
areas (figure 5). 
Finally, Copenhagen was the target for no less 
than two operational nuclear blasts. Here, the 
rational seems mostly political and could be seen 
as a purely political leverage against possible 
stubborn resistance, political as well as military. 
Also, as discussed above, the attack on Zealand is 
scheduled for day 5 and 6 and it is possible that the 
use of operational nuclear warheads against cities 
on Zealand should be understood as the outer 
limits in a process, which must be understood in 
the light of the constraints of incremental 
planning. In either case, the operational nuclear 
warheads must be seen as something of a “worm-
hole” linking the highly rationalistic military 
planning process and its expression in the map, 
back to a political reality, marked by the daunting 
perspectives and facilitated by a difference in 
cartographic representation. 
Turning to the cartographic representation of 
the military forces and actions on the map, we 
notice that these draw on a specialized form of 
cartographic symbolization, used by military 
organizations to visualize military movement and 
actions. From a Danish perspective, the standard 
symbols used by NATO are probably the most 
known set of such symbols, as they have been used 
both by the Danish military as well as in numerous 
computer games and movies. However, the symbol 
used in the Polish attack plans were aligned to 
standard symbols used by the Soviet military. 
Despite the differences during the Cold War, NATO 
and the Warszawa Pact agreed on one thing – the 
cartographic symbolization of the enemy: NATO 
always represent enemy units with a red colour 
and friendly forces with blue, but naturally the 
socialist armies marked friends with red and foe 
with blue. However, despite this consensus on the 
colouration, such specialized military symbols play 
an important performative role, as they link the 
military practice of fighting a war to the specific 
physical landscape and play an intricate role in the 
structuring of the landscape, as well as in the 
internal understanding and communication of and 
about the landscape (see also Svenningsen, 2014).
CONCLUSION 
Whether this map was actually smuggled out of 
Poland during the cold war and presented to the 
CIA or whether it was made available to NATO after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the map of the attack of 
the coastal front is a highly performative map. The 
 
Figure 5. Detail of the map showing the final attack on 
Zealand and clearly illustrating the five nuclear warheads 
planned to be used in the final days of the operation.
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map offers an outline of the assault on NATO in 
northern Germany and Denmark and casts the 
military paradigm of the WTO in the late 1960s as 
a highly aggressive one, where quick attacks using 
overwhelming forces and nuclear weapons were 
part of the order of the day. On the other hand, the 
map also tells the story of a Polish military 
engaged in internal discussions and storytelling, 
convincing itself of its means, capabilities and 
competences, while planning an attack on enemy 
forces. We do not know if the map served the first 
or the second purpose, or indeed both purposes, 
but we have a solid understanding of the map and 
the representations and language it uses.
We have analysed a map produced in the 
shadowlands between policy and military; a 
shadowland where it is nearly impossible to tell 
whether planning is performed based on political 
reasons or on the basis of rationalistic military 
considerations. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
map underlines the suggestion that politics and 
military actions are not a dichotomy, but rather a 
continuum. In the map, we have argued, we find 
testimonies to both. The use of nuclear weapons is 
one of these areas, where the use is obviously 
grounded in military considerations, but the use 
is, and has always been, highly politicized. On the 
one hand, the map gives very little attention to 
political divides or administrative borders, and we 
find a map where national borders may be 
recognizable, but take on a secondary role relative 
to the operational boundaries between the various 
elements of the Polish army, and in particular 
those of the Soviet Guards Army operating just 
south of the area of the Polish forces. 
The map uses a mode of expression particular to 
operational military maps, a mode of expression 
that details plans and intentions, but at the same 
time outlines and structures, not just the military 
perception of space, but a narrative of competence 
and ability to undertake difficult and dangerous 
missions. This, we have argued, is what turns this 
operational military map into a performative 
expression of intent and meaning, a trait we believe 
is present also in other regional military maps.
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